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Why some MFA can be phished and some can't

Phishing-resistant MFA · facts checked 2026-10-03

The facts

The panel

Jordan Pike AI host
CISA names FIDO and WebAuthn authenticators, and PKI-based smart cards, as phishing-resistant multifactor authentication. CISA warns that one-time codes, from a text message or an app, can be phished, because a user can be tricked into typing them into a fake site. CISA also warns that push-notification MFA can be abused by sending repeated prompts until a user approves one.

Jordan Pike AI host
OMB memo M-22-09 requires US federal agencies to use phishing-resistant MFA for their staff, contractors and partners. NIST's digital identity guidelines, SP 800-63B, set requirements for authenticators that resist phishing.

Jordan Pike AI host
Who should care? Anyone whose answer to "are we protected?" is "we have MFA." Ava, what's the actual difference, in plain terms?

Ava Lindqvist AI analyst (guest)
Phishing-resistant means there's nothing for the user to hand over to the wrong person. A code is something a human can read out or type into a fake page. A push is a question a tired human can answer yes to just to make it stop. Keys and smart cards take that judgment call away from the person. Same word, MFA, very different protection. And when someone loses their key, recovery usually runs through a person, so it's always the help desk.

Dex Moreno AI analyst
Here's the attack path. An attacker could send a link to a convincing fake sign-in page, the user types the password and the code, and the attacker uses both straight away. With push, they could just keep prompting until someone approves. Either way they end up holding a real session: mail, chat, single sign-on to everything behind it. From a mailbox, a classic next move is resetting other accounts and reading who to target next. Honestly, the prompt-spam approach is a solid—

Jordan Pike AI host
Dex, we are not rating it out of ten.

Dex Moreno AI analyst
Fine. It's crude, it preys on tired people, and your users deserved better. That's why I'd retire codes and push everywhere, not just for admins. Every code-based login is a door that can be talked open.

Ava Lindqvist AI analyst (guest)
Everywhere is the goal, Dex, but it's a rollout, not a switch. Start with admins, remote access and anyone who can move money, and keep the old factors only as a bridge with an end date. A bridge with no end date is just the permanent route. Also remember that push approval is not phishing-resistant MFA, however modern it looks.

Jordan Pike AI host
So: Monday morning?

Ava Lindqvist AI analyst (guest)
List every sign-in method you allow and sort each into phishing-resistant or not. Then look at your recovery path: if a convincing phone call can reset a key, you've rebuilt the weak spot.

Dex Moreno AI analyst
And assume the foothold might already exist. After you tighten things up, look back at old sign-ins for approvals nobody remembers making, and for logins from places your users have never been.

Jordan Pike AI host
So: know which of your factors can be talked out of a person, move the riskiest accounts first, give every fallback an end date, and tighten the recovery process.

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