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Deep dive: MOVEit and CL0P's mass data theft

MOVEit Transfer, 2023 · facts checked 2026-10-04

The facts

The panel

Jordan Pike AI host
Today's deep dive is the MOVEit Transfer data theft, in order. CISA and FBI said that, according to open-source information, CL0P, a ransomware gang also tracked as TA505, started exploiting MOVEit Transfer on May 27, 2023. CISA and FBI said the gang abused a zero-day SQL injection flaw, CVE-2023-34362, to plant a web shell called LEMURLOOT on internet-facing servers and steal data from their databases. CISA and FBI also said TA505 had run similar zero-day campaigns against Accellion file transfer appliances in 2020 and 2021, and GoAnywhere file transfer servers in early 2023.

Jordan Pike AI host
Progress Software told the SEC that on the evening of May 28, 2023, a customer called its MOVEit support team to report unusual activity in their MOVEit Transfer system. Progress Software said it found the zero-day on May 30, 2023, took its MOVEit Cloud service down to investigate, alerted customers, and released a patch for all supported versions on May 31. CISA added the MOVEit flaw to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on June 2, 2023, citing evidence of active exploitation.

Jordan Pike AI host
The US Government Accountability Office reported that federal agencies were among the multiple organisations using MOVEit, and that sensitive data was stolen through the exploitation. And Progress Software disclosed that in a letter dated August 7, 2024, the SEC told it the investigation into the incident was over and that no enforcement action would be recommended.

Jordan Pike AI host
If you run any file transfer system, or your vendors do, this one is for you. Dex, start with the way in: how does an attacker get from the internet to the data?

Dex Moreno AI analyst
The key phrase is internet-facing. A file transfer server exists to be reached from outside, so the front door is already open to anyone who can find it. A zero-day there means no defender had a patch to apply, and an attacker who gets code onto the server can leave a web shell, which is a quiet back door that survives after the first visit. From that foothold the attacker is next to the database holding the files, and these systems often hold stored credentials and connections to partners too. That is why this is a good stepping stone.

Dex Moreno AI analyst
Look at the pattern too. CISA and FBI described earlier campaigns against other file transfer products. That suggests a crew that treats these tools as a category: lots of sensitive data, one exposed service, and the theft is the whole business. No need to encrypt anything when taking the data is enough. Defenders can cut things off at the edge. Limit who can reach the service, watch for unexpected files on the server, and watch for large outbound transfers.

Jordan Pike AI host
Maya, the bug itself. SQL injection is not a new idea.

Maya Okafor AI analyst
It is a bug class that should have died in 2004. It happens when input from outside gets treated as part of a database command instead of as plain data, so the attacker can change what the database is asked to do. The facts don't say which part of MOVEit was affected, so I won't guess. A complete fix means parameterised queries everywhere that input reaches the database, plus a database account with only the permissions the application needs. A partial fix patches one spot or adds a filter, and the same class turns up in a sibling code path later. So when a vendor ships a patch, ask whether they did root-cause analysis on the whole class.

Maya Okafor AI analyst
On the supply chain side, inventory is the unglamorous answer. Do you know every file transfer tool in your estate, and every vendor of yours that runs one on your behalf? Many organisations only find out which of their suppliers use a product when the headlines land. Also check that you are on a supported version, because a patch for supported versions does nothing for a copy nobody maintains.

Jordan Pike AI host
Here is where you two differ. The patch came after exploitation had started. Is patching the answer, or is it the start?

Dex Moreno AI analyst
The start. The timeline shows exploitation began before anyone knew the flaw existed, so a patched server may still have a web shell sitting on it. Patching closes the door but doesn't tell you who is already inside. Assume the foothold may exist and hunt for it, back to the point exposure began.

Maya Okafor AI analyst
I agree on hunting, but order matters: patch first. Hunting on a server that is still vulnerable means you are checking for intruders while the door is still open. And the house view is that a known-exploited flaw on an internet-facing system is an emergency, patch or isolate within 72 hours. If you can't patch yet, a mitigation is a bridge, so give it an end date. Then on the hunting, ask how long your logs go back. If the logs are shorter than the exposure window, no evidence of compromise doesn't mean much.

Dex Moreno AI analyst
Fair. Patch first, hunt straight after, and don't treat the patch as the finish line. And for the board, don't say 'a vulnerability'. Say which customers' data sat on that system, and which regulator's clock starts if it was taken.

Jordan Pike AI host
So: Monday morning? List every file transfer system you and your suppliers run, patch or isolate any that are exposed, check for unexpected files and unusual outbound transfers, confirm how far back your logs go, and brief the board in business terms. The lesson from this one is that the data on these systems is the prize, so treat them as critical.

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