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Deep dive: the NotPetya cyberattack

NotPetya, June 2017 · facts checked 2026-10-04

The facts

The panel

Jordan Pike AI host
CISA said NotPetya was delivered on June 27, 2017 through M.E.Doc, a Ukrainian tax accounting software package. CISA said it tried to spread inside networks using the legitimate Windows tools PsExec and WMI, plus the EternalBlue and EternalRomance SMBv1 exploits, EternalBlue being the one WannaCry used. And CISA said that with administrator rights, NotPetya encrypted the master boot record, leaving Windows machines unusable, and that paying a ransom might not get victims' files back.

Jordan Pike AI host
The US Treasury said NotPetya caused damage worth billions of dollars in Europe, Asia and the United States, badly disrupting worldwide shipping, trade and medicine production. FedEx told investors, in an SEC filing, that the June 27 NotPetya attack seriously disrupted TNT Express operations around the world, and estimated its impact on the Express segment's quarterly operating results at $300 million.

Jordan Pike AI host
The UK government said the NCSC assessed the Russian military was almost certainly responsible, and that the attack posed as a criminal enterprise but was mainly meant to disrupt. In February 2018 the White House said the Russian military launched NotPetya, which it described as history's most destructive and costly cyber-attack, as part of an effort to destabilize Ukraine. In March 2018 the US Treasury sanctioned Russia's GRU military intelligence agency, noting that the GRU belongs to the Russian military, which it held directly responsible for NotPetya.

Jordan Pike AI host
That's the record. If you run Windows networks, or install business software from vendors you trust, this one is for you. Dex, walk us through the path from the front door onward.

Dex Moreno AI analyst
Start at the front door, because it's the clever part. The payload arrived inside a software package that businesses install on purpose. Nobody is suspicious of the thing they chose to install. The facts here don't say how the package was tampered with, so I'll stay with the general pattern: when a trusted product carries the payload, the usual perimeter checks have nothing to object to. The foothold is code running on a machine that is already inside the corporate network, and that's a very good place to start from.

Dex Moreno AI analyst
Then it moves on. CISA lists legitimate Windows administration tools next to exploits for the old SMBv1 protocol. The legitimate tools are the interesting part, because they look like an administrator doing a normal job. A defender has to spot the pattern, not a bad file. The exploit side shows how thin the line is between one famous outbreak and the next, since one of them was already used by WannaCry. A flat network with legacy protocols switched on gives a worm a very comfortable ride.

Dex Moreno AI analyst
And the endgame: administrator rights let it reach the master boot record, so the machine can't even start Windows. Worms like this move at machine speed, so the clock for a human to react is short. What defenders can still cut off is the path itself: how far administrator rights reach, how flat the network is, and which old protocols are still switched on. The foothold may be unavoidable. The spread is a choice.

Rina Takahashi AI analyst
Let me put the attribution in context, because every line of it is someone's claim. The UK government said the NCSC assessed the Russian military was almost certainly responsible. That's a calibrated confidence phrase, not a certainty. The White House and the US Treasury then went further and named responsibility directly. Different governments, different wording, same direction. I'd still cite them as assessments by named governments, not as something you or I verified.

Rina Takahashi AI analyst
The detail I'd underline is the one about posing as a criminal enterprise. It matters operationally. The ransom demand was a costume, and CISA's warning that paying might not bring files back says the same thing. So don't run your ransomware playbook on a destructive attack. If negotiation isn't a way out, recovery means rebuilding, and that depends on backups that administrator rights can't reach.

Jordan Pike AI host
So you have a trusted-software door, a spread phase, and wiped machines. Where would you put the first dollar?

Dex Moreno AI analyst
Retire SMBv1 and patch the spreading exploits first. It's concrete and it's checkable, and the facts show those exploits were the engine of the spread. Exposure beats elegance.

Rina Takahashi AI analyst
I'd push back a little. Your fix closes the exploits we know about, but the same facts say the worm also used legitimate administration tools, and no patch removes those. The next one may bring different exploits. I'd put limiting administrator rights and segmenting the network at the same priority, because they hold up against whichever technique comes next.

Dex Moreno AI analyst
Fair. I'll take both, as long as the legacy protocol work has an end date. A workaround that stays forever stops being a workaround. And assume a foothold can exist before you notice it, so look for unusual use of admin tools, not just known bad files.

Rina Takahashi AI analyst
And brief your board in business terms. The Treasury and FedEx statements read as lost shipping, trade, medicine production and quarterly results, not as malware names. Ask which of your operations stop if Windows machines won't start, and who can restore them without paying anyone. My Monday action: test a restore from backups that your administrator accounts can't touch, and treat vendor software updates as part of your attack surface.

Jordan Pike AI host
So, Monday morning: switch off or isolate SMBv1 where you can, with an end date. Cut back administrator rights and flat network paths. Watch for legitimate admin tools behaving oddly. Prove you can rebuild from clean backups. And treat any ransom note on a wiped machine with suspicion, since CISA said paying might not get files back. That's the NotPetya deep dive.

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