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Logs: what to keep, and for how long

Log retention · facts checked 2026-10-03

The facts

The panel

Jordan Pike AI host
OMB's memo M-21-31 requires US federal agencies to keep many types of logs in active storage for twelve months. OMB says the same memo calls for a further eighteen months of cold storage for those logs.

Jordan Pike AI host
NIST's guide to computer security log management is SP 800-92.

Jordan Pike AI host
Those are federal agency requirements, so they're not your deadline. They are a useful yardstick, though, if you run security anywhere else. Sam, why does retention matter so much?

Sam Kowalski AI analyst
Because "no evidence of compromise" means nothing until you know how long the logs were kept. Intrusions tend to be found long after the first access, so when a disclosure lands, assume the attacker got in earlier than the date on it. If your logs rolled over before anyone looked, you can't say what happened, and that's an awful thing to tell customers or a regulator.

Sam Kowalski AI analyst
Check your logs. Oh, you kept seven days?

Dex Moreno AI analyst
From the attacker's chair, short retention is a gift. Get in quietly, perhaps with a stolen login, sit still, move to systems that matter, and let the evidence age out on its own. A patient intruder could outwait a short window without lifting a finger. And logs kept only on the machine they describe are the first thing an intruder with control of that machine could tamper with. I'd give that patience an eight out of ten for elegance.

Jordan Pike AI host
Dex, we are not rating it out of ten.

Dex Moreno AI analyst
Fine. The target deserved better, and so did the person who had to explain the gap in the logs.

Sam Kowalski AI analyst
The two tiers in that memo are the practical idea here. Active storage means logs you can search fast when an incident is live. Cold storage is cheaper and slower, for the long tail when you need to look back and work out when it really began. Either way, the logs should be copied off the system that produced them, with clocks that agree, so the timeline holds together.

Dex Moreno AI analyst
My view: keep identity and remote-access logs as long as you can afford, because that's the trail of who came in and where they went next. Exposure beats severity, and the logs from your internet-facing systems are the ones attackers will cross first.

Sam Kowalski AI analyst
I'll push back a little. Not everything deserves the same retention. Keeping every source for years, unsearchable and untested, is a false comfort. Pick the sources that answer your likely questions, keep those longest, and prove you can actually search them. A bridge with an end date beats a hoard nobody can read.

Jordan Pike AI host
So the argument is breadth against usefulness, and you both agree on the starting point. The board will want it in business terms: which systems, which customers, and which regulator's clock. So: Monday morning?

Sam Kowalski AI analyst
Find out how long each log source is actually kept, not what the policy says. Then test it: ask for events from the oldest date you claim to hold and see whether they come back. My coffee has gone cold just thinking about the answers some teams will get.

Sam Kowalski AI analyst
Cold coffee, again. I count it as a severity indicator.

Dex Moreno AI analyst
Mine is to protect the logs as if an attacker will go looking for them, because one could. Send copies off the system, limit who can delete them, and alert when logging stops. A log source that goes quiet is a finding in its own right.

Jordan Pike AI host
That's the show: know your retention, copy logs somewhere safe, test the oldest ones, and compare your numbers against the federal yardstick. NIST's SP 800-92 is there if you want the longer read.

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