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OWASP Agentic Top 10, ASI03: Identity and privilege abuse

OWASP ASI03: Identity & privilege abuse · facts checked 2026-10-04

The facts

The panel

Jordan Pike AI host
OWASP's ASI03, identity and privilege abuse, is when attackers exploit the trust and delegation between agents, such as inherited or cached credentials, to escalate access and get around controls.

Jordan Pike AI host
OWASP recommends giving each agent its own identity, plus short-lived credentials scoped to a single task, to contain the damage if any one of them is abused. It also advises isolating each agent session in its own sandbox, with separate permissions and memory, and clearing that state after every task so cached secrets cannot be reused.

Jordan Pike AI host
OWASP says every privileged step should be re-checked by a central policy engine, and actions that raise privileges or cannot be undone should need a human's approval. It also recommends watching for agents that pick up extra permissions via a chain of delegations, such as a low-privilege agent being handed higher-privilege scopes mid-workflow.

Jordan Pike AI host
If your organisation is wiring AI agents into real systems, this one is for you. Dex, how does an attacker see this?

Dex Moreno AI analyst
Start with the weakest agent, the low-privilege one nobody worries about. Getting a foothold there could be as modest as steering it with bad input. On its own it can't do much. But agents trust each other, and trust is what ASI03 is about. If that agent holds cached credentials, or can be handed bigger scopes mid-workflow, the attacker doesn't need to break anything. They just ask nicely through the chain and inherit the access of whoever sits upstream.

Dex Moreno AI analyst
From there it's the usual lateral story: whatever the borrowed identity can reach, such as mail, tickets, data stores or other agents' tools, becomes the next stepping stone. And the controls get skipped because the request looks like a legitimate delegation. Honestly, that's an eight out of ten for elegance. The target deserved better.

Jordan Pike AI host
Dex, we are not rating it out of ten. Ava, why is the identity side so messy here?

Ava Lindqvist AI analyst (guest)
Because agents are non-human identities, and teams often let them borrow a person's access or share one service account. Then the logs say "the account did it" and you can't tell which agent, or which task. That's why a separate identity per agent matters. Short-lived, single-task credentials mean a stolen one expires quickly and opens very little. A stolen token skips MFA entirely, so shrinking what it's worth is the real defence.

Dex Moreno AI analyst
The sandbox advice is the underrated bit. Clearing state after every task means there are no leftover secrets sitting in memory for the next session, or the next attacker, to pick up. Cached credentials are convenient for the agent and for whoever compromises it. Convenience is the whole attack surface here.

Ava Lindqvist AI analyst (guest)
Where I'd push back is on human approval. It's right for actions that raise privileges or can't be undone. But if people get a prompt for everything, they approve everything. Push-approval habits are not phishing-resistant, and the same fatigue applies to agents. Keep approvals rare enough that a person actually reads them.

Dex Moreno AI analyst
Agreed, with one addition. The central policy engine should be the thing that decides, not the agent's own judgement. An agent that can talk itself into more access will eventually be talked into it by someone else.

Jordan Pike AI host
So: Monday morning? Ava, you first.

Ava Lindqvist AI analyst (guest)
Inventory every agent and give each its own identity with short-lived, single-task credentials. If an agent is running on a shared or borrowed account, fix that first.

Dex Moreno AI analyst
Set up alerting for any agent that gains scopes mid-workflow, and make sure privilege-raising actions go through the policy check. Then assume one agent is already misbehaving and look for it.

Jordan Pike AI host
Separate identities, short-lived credentials, clean sandboxes, a central check, and a human for the irreversible stuff. That's the OWASP list for ASI03.

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