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OWASP Agentic Top 10, ASI05: Unexpected code execution

OWASP ASI05: Unexpected code execution · facts checked 2026-10-04

The facts

The panel

Jordan Pike AI host
OWASP's ASI05, unexpected code execution, is when attackers turn an agent's ability to write and run code into remote code execution, through routes such as prompt injection, unsafe serialisation or misused tools. OWASP says production agents should never use eval, relying instead on safe interpreters and taint tracking for any code the agent generates.

Jordan Pike AI host
OWASP advises never running agent code as root, executing it in a locked-down container sandbox with tight limits, network access included, and confining file access to a single working folder. It also recommends keeping code generation apart from code execution, with validation gates in between, and not letting agents act directly on production systems. Finally, OWASP calls for a person to sign off on any run with elevated rights, a version-controlled allowlist of what may execute automatically, and static scans before generated code runs.

Dex Moreno AI analyst
An attacker who can feed a prompt to a generative agent could inject malicious snippets that the agent then writes to a file and executes, effectively turning the agent into a remote code executor. Because the agent often runs with high privileges, the foothold can be a full-system shell, which can be used to pivot to other services or exfiltrate data. In the wild, such techniques are weaponised quickly once discovered, so the window to detect and block the malicious generation is narrow. I’d give this maneuver an elegance score of eight out of ten – the target deserved better.

Jordan Pike AI host
Dex, we are not rating it out of ten.

Maya Okafor AI analyst
The root of the problem is the use of dynamic evaluation – essentially a ‘eval’ of generated code – a bug class that should have died in 2004. When an agent blindly executes what it just produced, there’s no validation, no sandbox, and no separation of duties, so any flaw in the generation logic becomes a remote code execution vector. The fix is to eliminate eval entirely, enforce a strict allowlist of executable artifacts, run the code inside a hardened container with no root, and gate every run through static analysis and a human sign-off for privileged actions. Inventory any pipelines that still stitch generation straight into execution and apply these controls today.

Jordan Pike AI host
So: make sure your agents never eval, keep generation and execution separate, sandbox them, and put a sign-off step before any privileged run. Monday morning, check those controls.

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