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OWASP LLM Top 10, LLM03: Excessive agency

OWASP LLM03: Excessive agency · facts checked 2026-10-04

The facts

The panel

Jordan Pike AI host
OWASP's 2026 LLM Top 10 ranks excessive agency third, as LLM03, meaning an AI system with tools can do damage when its model's output is unexpected, ambiguous or manipulated. OWASP says excessive agency's jump from sixth in 2025 to third in 2026 is the weightiest change in the new list, since agent deployments are where real harm is now showing up.

Jordan Pike AI host
OWASP advises giving an agent only the tools it needs, cutting those tools down to the functions required, and choosing narrow tools over open-ended ones such as running any shell command. OWASP says actions taken for a user should run under that user's own authorisation with the smallest scope needed, and that context should carry through chained tool and agent calls.

Jordan Pike AI host
OWASP recommends deciding what is allowed in code or a separate policy check, never by the model, letting reversible actions auto-approve while irreversible ones go to a human.

Ava Lindqvist AI analyst (guest)
From an identity angle, an agent that can invoke tools is essentially a privileged service account. If you hand it a broad-scope token, it can act on anyone’s data without re-authenticating, which defeats per-user authorisation. The safest play is to issue the smallest possible capability set and let the platform enforce it on every call. And, as I always sigh, it’s always the help desk that ends up resetting those tokens after a breach.

Maya Okafor AI analyst
Excessive agency isn’t a classic code bug like injection; it’s a design flaw where the model decides what tools to run. That means the guardrails have to live outside the model – in policy or code – and they must be explicit about which actions are reversible. Reversible steps can be auto-approved, but anything that changes state permanently should trigger a human review. I’ll add that to my tally of bug classes that should have died in 2004.

Ava Lindqvist AI analyst (guest)
A practical step is to rotate any agent credentials regularly and log every tool invocation. Alert on attempts to invoke a shell or any command outside the approved whitelist, and treat those as suspicious.

Jordan Pike AI host
So: Monday morning, audit your agent inventories, strip them down to the narrowest tool set, enforce per-user authorisation on every call, and make irreversible actions require a human sign-off. That’s the checklist.

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