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OWASP LLM Top 10, LLM05: Data and model poisoning

OWASP LLM05: Data and model poisoning · facts checked 2026-10-04

The facts

The panel

Jordan Pike AI host
OWASP's 2026 LLM Top 10 lists data and model poisoning as LLM05, meaning someone corrupts the data used to train, fine-tune or build embeddings for a model, or its files, to plant backdoors, bias or weaknesses. OWASP's 2026 edition moves the entry from fourth to fifth and folds attacks that subvert fine-tuning into it.

Jordan Pike AI host
OWASP advises recording dataset and model lineage in a machine-learning bill of materials, enforcing signing and verification, and versioning datasets so poisoned changes can be rolled back. OWASP also says model add-ons such as chat templates, tokenizer configs, adapters and quantized files are security-relevant code, to be signed, hash-checked and analysed before deployment.

Jordan Pike AI host
And OWASP recommends probing models with trigger-based prompts after every alignment cycle, warning that safety training cannot be assumed to remove hidden backdoors.

Jordan Pike AI host
So if your team trains, fine-tunes or just downloads models, this one is yours. Maya, start us off: what actually goes wrong here, and why does it keep happening?

Maya Okafor AI analyst
This is an integrity problem, not a classic coding bug. A model's behaviour is built from whatever went into it, so if someone corrupts the training data, the fine-tuning data or the embeddings, the model faithfully learns the attacker's lesson. The nasty version is a backdoor: the model behaves normally in every test you think to run, then does something different when a specific trigger shows up. It keeps happening because teams pull data and model files from outside and treat them as inert. They are not inert. Untrusted input treated as trusted is going on my list of things that should have died in two thousand four.

Sam Kowalski AI analyst
From the response side, poisoning is miserable because the evidence is the model itself. Something odd happens in production and you need to know which dataset, which fine-tune and which add-on file went into it. If nobody wrote lineage down, you cannot scope the problem. You can only retrain and hope. That is why OWASP's dataset versioning matters: it is the difference between rolling back one bad change and rebuilding from scratch.

Sam Kowalski AI analyst
And when someone says there is no sign of tampering, my first question is how long the records go back. Check your logs. Oh, you kept seven days? My coffee just went cold, and I am treating that as a severity indicator.

Maya Okafor AI analyst
The part people miss is the wrapping around the model. Chat templates, tokenizer configs, adapters, quantized files: OWASP calls these security-relevant code, and I agree. A tiny config file feels like documentation, but it shapes what the model sees and says. A complete fix treats every one of them like a dependency. Sign it, hash-check it, analyse it before deployment, and keep a bill of materials so you know who else is using the same upstream pieces.

Sam Kowalski AI analyst
Here is where I push back a little. Signing and hash checks prove the file is what the publisher shipped. They do not prove it is clean. If the poison went in before the signature, you have a very well-authenticated backdoor. So verification is the floor, and I want the probing OWASP describes on top of it.

Maya Okafor AI analyst
Agreed on the limit, but I would not let that delay the basics. Provenance checks are cheap and they stop the whole class of swapped or tampered files. Probing is expensive and can only find the triggers you think to try. Do both, but do the cheap one first. And the key point from OWASP is that safety training cannot be assumed to remove a hidden backdoor, so you re-probe after every alignment cycle, not once at launch.

Jordan Pike AI host
So: Monday morning? Maya, one concrete thing.

Maya Okafor AI analyst
Inventory every model, dataset and add-on file you use, and where each came from. Then require signing and hash verification before anything is deployed. If you cannot say where a file came from, treat it as untrusted.

Sam Kowalski AI analyst
Version your datasets and keep the lineage records longer than you think you need. When something strange turns up, you want to roll back a known change, not guess. And schedule the trigger-based probing after each alignment cycle, with someone owning the results.

Jordan Pike AI host
The short version: know what went into your models, verify it, and test for what verification can't see. That is LLM05 from OWASP's 2026 list.

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