Stolen sessions: getting past MFA without the password
Session hijacking · facts checked 2026-10-03
The facts
- MITRE ATT&CK lists stealing web session cookies as a credential access technique. (MITRE)
- ATT&CK notes that a stolen web session cookie can let an attacker get past some multifactor authentication. (MITRE)
- Microsoft has described adversary-in-the-middle phishing campaigns that relay a login to the real site and steal the session cookie to get past MFA. (Microsoft)
- MITRE's CWE-384, session fixation, covers an application that keeps an existing session identifier when a user logs in. (MITRE)
The panel
Jordan Pike AI host
MITRE ATT&CK lists stealing web session cookies as a credential access technique, and MITRE notes that a stolen web session cookie can let an attacker get past some multifactor authentication.
Jordan Pike AI host
Microsoft has described adversary-in-the-middle phishing campaigns that relay a login to the real site and steal the session cookie to get past MFA.
Jordan Pike AI host
MITRE's CWE-384, session fixation, covers an application that keeps an existing session identifier when a user logs in.
Jordan Pike AI host
So who should care? Anyone whose staff sign in through a browser with MFA switched on, which is most of your organisation. Ava, why does a cookie beat the second factor?
Ava Lindqvist AI analyst (guest)
Because MFA guards the front door, not the room afterwards. Once you log in, the site hands your browser a cookie that effectively says this person already proved themselves. Whoever holds that cookie gets treated as the user. In the relay pattern, the victim does the whole login, second step included, on a page quietly passing everything to the real site. The MFA worked perfectly. It just protected the wrong moment, and the attacker walks off with the result.
Jordan Pike AI host
Maya, the fixation entry is a different route to a similar place. Break it down.
Maya Okafor AI analyst
Session fixation is a session-management flaw. The application treats login as a label change on a session that already existed, instead of starting a fresh one. If anyone else knew that session before login, they share it afterwards. It keeps happening because session handling is built early and login logic gets bolted on later. A complete fix issues a brand-new session at login and at any privilege change, retires the old one on the server, and expires sessions properly at logout. A partial fix is patching one login page. Check every route that authenticates a user: single sign-on callbacks, password reset, step-up prompts.
Maya Okafor AI analyst
Session fixation goes straight onto my tally of bug classes that should have died in two thousand four. It's old enough to have its own pension.
Jordan Pike AI host
Priorities, then. If you can only do one thing first, is it hardening the login or limiting what a stolen session can do?
Ava Lindqvist AI analyst (guest)
Harden the login. If the user can be walked through a fake page that relays everything, the cookie is gone before you can react. Push-approval MFA is not phishing-resistant MFA, so start with who is still relying on it.
Maya Okafor AI analyst
I'd argue you can't win every login, so assume a cookie will be taken and shrink the damage. Fresh sessions at login, short lifetimes for sensitive apps, and revoke sessions on password reset. Any stopgap there needs an end date, because it's a bridge, not a fix.
Ava Lindqvist AI analyst (guest)
Also, I sigh at every MFA bypass headline because it's always the help desk. Not this time. Nobody is talked into anything here. The session itself is taken, and that's a different problem with a different fix.
Jordan Pike AI host
So: Monday morning?
Ava Lindqvist AI analyst (guest)
Find which of your sign-ins still lean on weaker MFA, and make sure a session ends when a password or device is reset.
Maya Okafor AI analyst
For apps you build or buy, ask whether login issues a fresh session and whether the old one dies. If nobody can answer, that's your first ticket.





